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Abstract
Most models that try to explain economic growth indicate exponential
growth paths. In recent years, however, a lively discussion has emerged con-
sidering the validity of this notion. In the empirical literature dealing with
drivers of economic growth, the majority of articles is based upon an implicit
assumption of exponential growth. Few scholarly articles have addressed this
issue so far. In order to shed light on this issue, we estimate autoregressive
integrated moving average time series models based on Gross Domestic Prod-
uct Per Capita data for 18 mature economies from 1960 to 2013. We compare
the adequacy of linear and exponential growth models and conduct several
robustness checks. Our findings cast doubts on the widespread belief of expo-
nential growth and suggest a deeper discussion on alternative economic grow
theories.
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Do Mature Economies Grow Exponentially?
1 Introduction
On November 2013, Lawrence Summer gave a seminal presentation at the annual
IMF Research Conference on policy responses to the current economic crises. At
this point, the great majority of economists studying the financial and the European
economic crisis shared the view, that economic growth needed to be reestablished
in order to solve the crisis. They solely disagreed upon the way to get there,
being divided into two camps the austerity versus Keynesian stimulus proponents.
Instead of arguing for either one of the two, Summers surprised his audience with
an innovative perspective on the debate. He argued, that the US economy has
entered secular stagnation - a new phase with constant low growth rates, and that
this situation was about to stay.
Summers is not the first to observe the persistently low growth rates though. Sev-
eral authors have, some already before the economic crises following 2007, argued
that growth rates are falling in mature economies, that is, economies that typ-
ically were part of the first wave of industrialization and have high per capita
incomes today. While most economists reason that high growth rates can and
should be regained (Reuter, 2000, p. 17), according to this diverging analysis the
low growth rates after the crisis are a continuation of decreasing growth rates for
several decades. In fact, it is argued that post-war growth in mature economies
depicts rather a linear than an exponential trend.
A significant number of authors argue that economic growth in early industrial-
ized, high-income countries depicts linear instead of exponential growth Afheldt
(1994); Altvater (2006); Bourcarde and Herzmann (2006); Glo¨tzl; Reuter (2002);
Wegweiser et al. (2014); Hector Pollitt, Anthony Barker et al. (2004). These works
are to a large degree grey literature and to our knowledge particularly strong within
German-speaking debates. Even a subgroup of the German parliamentary commis-
sion on Growth, Welfare, Quality of Life expresses the view that macroeconomic
growth in Germany has depicted linear instead of exponential growth in the past:
Wie die Entwicklung des BIP in Deutschland in der Vergangenheit aber zeigt [...],
hat das BIP dauerhaft lediglich mit konstanten jhrlichen Zuwchsen zugenommen,
also linear statt exponentiell (p. 136). To our knowledge only two studies inves-
tigated this question empirically for a set of countries. Bourcarde and Herzmann
(2006) find linear growth for 15 and exponential growth for 5 countries out of a
sample of 20 countries. They look at macroeconomic growth instead of per capita
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growth though and do not apply rigorous statistical methods. Wibe and Carlen
(2006) investigates the Gross Domestic Product Per Capita growth path of a total
of 28 countries and country aggregates. Their results indicate a linear growth in the
majority of the sample. We extend the work of Bourcarde and Herzmann (2006)
and Wibe and Carlen (2006) by using more recent data sets and more advanced
statistical tools.
The question, whether economic growth is exponential, depicts decreasing growth
rates or is of linear kind has important implications. First, it has serious implica-
tions for economic theory. The majority of economic (and in particular growth)
theories explicitly or implicitly assume exponential growth rates, as we see below.
If we observe linear growth, the theories and models need to be adjusted. Second,
various policies depend on the size of growth:
• Employment: If unemployment is the outcome of an interplay between produc-
tivity growth and economic growth Mankiw (2010), what labor policies are
needed in case of linear economic growth?
• Public debt: If calculations of the GDP to debt ratio and of debt repayments
are calculated based on predictions involving exponential growth rates, these
become unreliable in case of linear growth (Seidl and Zahrnt, 2010).
• Social security: The financing of social security systems is usually shaped ac-
cording to growth predictions based on exponential growth. In the situation
of linear growth the common projections of the financing of security systems
become unreliable and new strategies for long-term financing need to be de-
veloped (Chancel and Waisman, 2013).
• Environment: There are two opposing views on the relationship between eco-
nomic growth and environmental implications of economic activities. The
first argues for a Kuznets-Curve like relation. In growing economies, environ-
mental effects first increase and later decrease again (Grossman and Krueger,
1994). This view is increasingly repudiated though Stern et al. (1996); Dinda
(2004); Kaika and Zervas (2013). In the second view efficiency gains are not
correlated with economic growth (Stern, 2004). Therefore, economic growth
is associated with increasing environmental effects (Victor and Rosenbluth,
2007; Jackson, 2009; Kallis et al., 2012). In particular in the case of cli-
mate change, growth is argued to increase environmental effects Kaika and
Zervas (2013). Linear growth changes the calculations on the relationship
between economic growth and environmental impacts. This is likely to help
explain why decoupling seems to have taken place in certain countries re-
cently (Agency, 2014) and it changes the necessary efficiency gains needed,
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which are usually calculated based on exponential growth Jackson (2009).
In this article we first examine prominent orthodox and heterodox economic growth
theories to what extend they do or do not predict exponential growth and why this
is the case (section 2), leading to the development of an exponential and a linear
growth function. The methods to test these functions empirically for 18 countries
from 1960-2013 are described in section 3. The corresponding results are presented
in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature
2.1 Exponential growth as an inherent feature of modern growth
theories
Exponential economic growth is deeply routed within economic science and in par-
ticular within growth theories: Mainstream macroeconomic theory is profoundly
oriented towards an assumption of continuous, exponential GDP growth. Disrup-
tions in economic activity, such as expansions and recessions, are perceived as devi-
ations from the standard conception of a long-term stable macroeconomic growth
path (Pirgmaier et al., 2010, p. 1). The feature of exponential growth is part of
growth theories throughout the history of economic thought. In the following, we
give an overview of its role within several prominent schools of economic thought.
2.1.1 Early modern growth theories
After the classical contributions, which were very much engaged with growth the-
ory (although they termed it differently), economic growth became less prominent
in economics. Following the Great Recession in 1930 the topic became central
again. Harrod and Domar developed growth theories which entail concepts similar
to Keynes’ arguments at the time. Solow presented a first growth model in line
with neoclassical thought and his model became central for neoclassical growth
theory ever since.
Harrod
Harrod (1939) developed the concepts of warranted, actual and natural growth
rates. The warranted growth rate (gw) refers to the growth rate necessary for all
savings to be invested. The growth rate depends on the savings rate (s) and the
capital coefficient (v), as the later determines how much more can be produced per
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unit of investments: gw =
s
v
1. The actual growth rate depends on the actual in-
vestments taking place. Assuming that all savings are equally used for investments,
the actual growth rate is given by
ga =
s
va
, (1)
with the actual increase in the capital coefficient va. The natural growth rate can
be regarded as an upper boundary of growth depending in particular on the labour
supply due to population growth and the work/leisure preference (Harrod, 1939,
p. 30). The central concept is in his own words: the geometric rate of growth of
income or output in the system, the increment being expressed as a fraction of its
existing level (Harrod, 1939, p. 16). All three kinds of growth are expressed as
growth rates.
The explanation lies within the setup of the model. Harrod builds his argument
on ratio parameters, most importantly the savings rate and the capital coefficient.
When savings are a percentage of production/income and investments need to
equal savings, investments grow exponentially. The same holds for the capital
coefficient: If the relation between capital and production increases by a certain
percentage each year, the capital intensity of the economy grows exponentially. As
a consequence, also production grows in an exponential manner.
Domar
The work by Domar (1946) constitutes the second pillar of modern growth theory.
In his approach, investments (I) on the one hand increase the capacity to produce
(dP ), dependent on the potential productivity of investments (σ) (Domar calls it
the potential social average investment productivity (Domar, 1946, p. 140)). This
is termed the capacity effect : dPdt = σI. On the other hand, investments increase
demand (dD). Its size depends on the size of investments and the savings rate, as
a lower savings rate imply a higher multiplier effect. This so-called demand effect
is given by: dDdt =
dI
dt
1
s . Setting the two equal gives the condition that the growth
rate of investments (gI) needs to be equal to the product of the savings rate and
the potential productivity of investments:
gI = sσ. (2)
For Domars analysis the same holds as for Harrods: he builds his argument on ratio
parameters as the potential productivity of capital and the savings rate. Assum-
1The equations of this and the following sections are based on the respective articles referred
to.
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ing a constant savings rate, exponential growth of investments is needed to make
use of savings. If the productivity of investments stays constant, this implies also
exponential economic growth.
Solow model
Solow (1956) developed, simultaneously to very similar work by Swan (1956), the
first neoclassical growth model. In this theory, the growth rate of the capital stock
( k˙k ) is determined by investments, which depend on savings (sF [k]) and the depre-
ciation of the capital stock (δk): k˙k = s
F [k]
k −δ. In his model, the capital per worker
has decreasing marginal productivity. As the depreciation rate of the capital stock
does not change, capital accumulation comes to an end. This is not the case if tech-
nological change is included. Therefore, Solows model is extended by introducing
Harrod-neutral (i.e. labour-augmenting) technological change, which increases the
productivity of labor. It implies a growth of the effective labor, which leads to a
lower capital/labor ratio and subsequently increases the marginal productivity of
capital. Hence, investments become profitable again. In this scenario, the steady
state rate of economic growth is entirely determined by the speed of technological
change x (Barro and Sala-i martin, 2004):
g = x. (3)
Accordingly, the model produces exponential growth if a constant value for the
speed of technological change is assumed.
2.1.2 Neoclassical Growth Theories
Since Solow’s contributions, plenty of types and variations of neoclassical growth
models have been developed. In the following, the three most prominent types
are described. The neoclassical textbook model provides the microfoundations to
Solow’s model. The AK-model introduces constant returns to capital by including
human capital, and models with imperfect competition endogenize technological
change.
Neoclassical Textbook Growth Model
While Solow assumed a certain savings rate and a certain investment behavior of
firms, neoclassical growth models are based on the behavior of a representative
household and a representative firm. Households maximize utility due to a utility
function. Their savings depend on their preferences and the interest rate. Firms
maximize profits. They invest until the marginal productivity of capital is equal to
the real interest rate plus the rate of depreciation. Subsequently, in these models
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savings and investments are brought into equilibrium via the interest rate (Barro
and Sala-i martin, 2004, Chapter 2).
The equilibrium growth rate of the capital stock is similar to the Solow-model.
The change in the capital stock is determined by the difference between output
and consumption. Additionally, the capital needed for depreciation and due to
technological change is subtracted:
˙ˆ
k
k =
f(kˆ)−cˆ
kˆ
− (δ + x).
The growth of per capita income (g) depends - as in the Solow model primarily on
the rate of technological progress (x) though: the steady-state per capita growth
rate equals the rate of technological progress, x, which is assumed to be exogenous
(Barro and Sala-i martin, 2004, p. 205). Also, A greater willingness to save or an
improvement in the level of technology shows up in the long run as higher levels of
capital and output per effective worker but in no change in the per capita growth
rate (p. 210):
g = x. (4)
The neoclassical textbook model therefore leads to the same conclusion concerning
exponential growth as did the Solow-model: As long as technological change is
assumed to be of a constant rate, economic growth is exponential.
Endogenous growth I: The AK-model
The unsatisfactory result from neoclassical growth theories, that economic growth
depends purely on an exogenously given rate of technological progress in the neo-
classical growth theories motivated the development of models which explain con-
tinuous growth differently. In the AK-model capital has constant instead of dimin-
ishing marginal returns, due to the fact that capital is understood in broader terms,
including human capital. Production in this model depends on the technological
state (a) and the amount of capital (k): y = ak. Growth of capital per capita
( k˙k ) and income per capita (
y˙
y or g) depend, without technological change, on the
size of net investments which depend on the savings rate and the depreciation rate
(Barro and Sala-i martin, 2004, Chapter 1 and 4):
g =
y˙
y
=
k˙
k
= sA− δ (5)
The AK-model is therefore also designed to depict exponential growth. The reason
lies within the ratio of the savings rate that determines capital accumulation with
constant returns. Thereby investments grow exponentially and so does per capita
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income.
Endogenous growth II: Imperfect competition
Endogenous growth models with imperfect competition assume markets (of monop-
olistic competition) (Aghion et al., 1998) in which firms invest into new production
methods or the improvements of the existing methods because they have a tem-
porary patent on the new method which allows them to make profits. The rate of
technological change and hence the rate of economic growth depends on how fast
new intermediate goods are invented. This is determined by several factors. First,
the preferences of households concerning consumption and savings (θ represents
the households willingnesses to have different consumption levels over time and ρ
stands for the time preference of the households) influence the amount of resources
put into developing new technologies. A second set of parameters influence the
speed of technological change: The price of inventing new technologies (η) and the
size of the mark-up (α) a firm can put on the new technology. Finally, the state
of technology (A) and the amount of the labor employed (L) influence the growth
rate. The following equation gives an example of the determinants of economic
growth (Barro and Sala-i martin, 2004, Chapter 6 and 7):
Y˙
Y
=
1
θ
[
L
η
A
1
1−α (
1− α
α
)α
2
1−α − ρ]. (6)
Here, growth is also represented as a rate (this time it is not per capita growth
but macroeconomic growth). A change in each of the factors mentioned therefore
alters the rate of growth. Again, constant parameters lead to exponential growth
in this model.
2.1.3 Heterodox growth theories
In neoclassical frameworks growth depends on two central aspects: savings lead
to investments and technological change increases labor productivity. Heterodox
growth theories also regard these factors as central, but analyze the underlying
mechanisms very differently. Generally speaking, investments are not only deter-
mined by savings but also other factors and technological change either depends
on investments or is the effect of market competition.
Marxian
In Marx’s theory, firms buy labor (variable capital), materials and physical capital
(constant capital) in order to manufacture products that they sell on a competi-
tive market. Firms can make profits due to the exploitation of labor, i.e. because
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workers are paid due to their cost of reproduction that usually is below the value
of their labor power (Harvey, 2006). As firms sell their products on a competitive
market they are forced to invest their profits into new production technologies. In
case they do not so, they are outcompeted by their rivals who did and therefore
are able to offer products at a lower price (Mandel, 1969). The degree of competi-
tion is the prime determinant of the share of profits (a) reinvested (a = Ipi ). The
profit rate (r) is primarily due to the bargaining process between capital and labor
(r = piK ). The growth rate of the capital stock, which is equivalent to the growth
rate of output (g) depends on these two factors (Hein, 2002):
g =
I
K
= ar. (7)
Investments go hand in hand with technological change. The introduction of new
technologies changes the organic composition of capital. It increases the ratio be-
tween constant and variable capital. Investments hence have ambiguous effects on
employment. On the one hand they increase the demand for labor, as production
increases. On the other hand, the labor-coefficient decreases, which decreases the
demand for labor. Marx argues, that the second mechanism guarantees a continu-
ous existence of a ’reserve army’, i.e. a continuous availability of workers.
Whether the Marxian theory suggests an exponential growth pattern or not is up to
constant debate. It is disputed under the term Tendency of the rate of profit to fall.
On the one hand it is argued, that the change in the organic composition of capital
decreases the profit rate. The intuitive reason is, that surplus is generated due
to the exploitation of labor power. Therefore, assuming everything else constant,
using relatively less labor in the production process also implies less possibility
to generate surplus and profits. On the other hand, if the surplus rate (the ratio
between surplus and variable capital) increases, this tendency can be countervailed
(Sweezy, 1943). Hence, the Marxian analysis leaves it open, whether economic
growth takes place at a certain rate (and hence is exonential) or whether the growth
rate declines.
Kalecki
Kalecki et al. (1987) developed a growth theory that builds on both Marxian and
Keynesian analyses and concepts. Investments are at the center of his argument.
The economy is divided into three sectors which produce (1) capital goods for
investments (I), (2) consumption goods for capitalists (CK) and (3) consumption
goods for workers (CW ). The size of the economy Y is therefore given by Y = I +
CK+CW . In each sector capitalists earn profits (P ) and workers earn wages (W ).
There are no savings out of wages. Investments and the consumption of capitalists
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determine profits: P = I +CK. Investments determine growth. Its effect depends
on the wage share (w) and the consumption rate of profits (q):∆Y = ∆I(1−w)(1−q) .
According to Kalecki et al. (1987) there are five central determinants of investments.
(1) Firms savings (S) induce entrepreneurs to invest more, as they have more fi-
nancial means. (2) An increase (decrease) in firms profits ∆P∆t stimulate (attenuate)
them to increase investments because production has become more profitable. (3)
A change in the capital stock ∆K∆t increases/decreases investments because addi-
tional profits due to investments are lower/higher for a higher/lower level of existing
capital. (4) An increase in production in the past ∆Y∆t induces investments because
inventories are proportionate to production. (5) Finally, investments may change
due to various long run changes (d) in the economy (technological change, interest
rate, company share earnings): It+1 = aSt + b
∆P
∆t − c∆K∆t + e∆Y∆t + d.
Kalecki further argues, that the change in profits, the change of the capital stock
and the change in production all primarily depend on the investments of the past.
Subsequently, investments are a function of past investments, several behavioral
parameters (covered by a, b, c, e, q, p) and the long-term changes (d): It+1 = aIt −
c∆K∆t +
1
1−q (b+
e
1−w )
∆I
∆t + d
Investments are the sum of a fraction of the past investment level (aIt), the change
of investments in the past multiplied by some constant ( 11−q (b+
e
1−w )
∆I
∆t ) and the
change of the capital stock multiplied by some constant (c∆K∆t ). Assuming constant
behavioral parameters, economic growth in Kaleckis theory therefore tends to also
be exponential. This can best be illustrated by assuming that a = 1 and abstracting
from depreciation of the capital stock. Defining f = 11−q (b+
e
1−w ), we get
It+1 = It + (f − c)∆I
∆t
. (8)
As long as f > c, the growth of investments is therefore of exponential nature.
Assuming a constant capital coefficient and constant population, economic growth
is therefore also exponential. The result can only be different, if the parameters
change over time.
The standard Keynesian growth model
(Hein, 2004, chapter 7) develops a standard Keynesian model of growth and dis-
tribution. In this model there are only savings out of profits, so the savings rate
(savings/capital stock, s) is equal to the savings ratio out of profits (spi) multiplied
by the profit rate (profits/capital stock, r): s = spir. The growth rate of the capital
stock is firstly determined by animal spirits (α) (e.g. (Fontana and Sawyer, 2015))
and, secondly, by the investment reaction (β) to the profit rate (r): g = α + βr
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(e.g. Kalecki et al. (1987)). A steady-state growth rate exists, where the growth
rate (g) is equal to the savings rate: g = s. Combining these equations one gets
the equilibrium growth rate
g = s =
spiα
spi − β (9)
In this case, the growth rate stays constant, if the other parameters also stay
constant. Again the model depicts exponential growth.
2.2 Explanations for diminishing growth rates
Discussions on an end to economic growth have existed at least since the beginning
of modern economic theory. All the major classical economists had a concept of
the steady-state, that marked an end to economic expansion (Luks, 2001). The
term secular stagnation was coined by (Hansen, 1939) in the Great Depression. He
argued that a limit to geographical expansion, seizing population growth and less
capital-intensive technologies resulted in lower investment rates and lower growth.
In the first controversy on this issue, Schumpeter (1939) on the other hand argued
that unfavorable business conditions for entrepreneurs were the reason for lacking
growth rates. While this first discussion was ended by World War Two and the
economic expansion of Western Europe and Northern America afterwards, it came
up again with the stagflation in the 1970s. Sweezy (1982) argued, that again
the lack of investments was the reason that, while recovery of a growth path was
possible in theory, nothing like that is visible on the horizon now (Sweezy, 1982,
p. 9). The discussion has been taken up again after the global financial crisis after
2007 and has gained momentum after the speech by Summers mentioned in the
beginning of this article. However, there are also arguments for declining and/or
linear growth which are not associated to the term secular stagnation. In the
following several different reasonings, which mostly also refer to one or several of
the theoretical frameworks developed in section 2, are discussed.
2.2.1 Slower technological change
As we have seen above, technology plays a central role in explaining economic
growth. Hence, it is not surprising that some authors see slower technological
change as being the reason for declining growth rates. It is argued, that the tech-
nological progress in recent decades has increased labor productivity less than in
the decades before and that it is the nature of the technological change that is the
explanatory of less growth. Gordon (2012) argues that capitalism has experienced
10
three industrial revolutions (IR): ”The first (IR #1) with its main inventions be-
tween 1750 and 1830 created steam engines, cotton spinning, and railroads. The
second (IR #2) was the most important, with its three central inventions of elec-
tricity, the internal combustion engine, and running water with indoor plumbing, in
the relatively short interval of 1870 to 1900. [...] The computer and Internet revo-
lution (IR #3) began around 1960 and reached its climax in the dot.com era of the
late 1990s“ (Gordon, 2012, p. 1-2). For him the divergent impacts of the innova-
tions on labor productivity explain different growth rates. Much of the high growth
rates in the 1950s to 1970s can be explained by a combination of applications of
technologies from the second and third industrial revolution. Since 1972 the effects
of the implication of technologies from the second industrial revolution have faded
out and the remaining effects of the third revolution are a major explanation for the
low growth rates that we observe today in mature economies(Gordon, 2014a). This
analysis directly refers to the early growth theories with exogenous technological
growth. While Gordon takes into account that the speed of technological change
is also influenced by other factors, he argues for a baseline rate of technological
change Gordon (2014b). This baseline is exogenously given.
2.2.2 Labor and human capital
Within the recent discussion on secular stagnation there are two arguments con-
cerning labor. First, the average number of working hours per capita has decreased
and is predicted to continue to do so in the future. While the average working hours
per worker have declined in Europe (not so much in Northern America), the par-
ticipation rate of women has increased Maddison (2006). As someone also has to
do the reproductive work, this leaves little room for an extension of labor hours
in the future (Netzwerk Vorsorgendes Wirtschaften, 2013). The major reason for
declining average working hours is the demographic change though, leading to an
increase in the dependency ratio. This is anticipated to continue in the future for
almost all countries investigated in this paper. Based on these findings, Johansson
and Guillemette (2012) come to the conclusion that ’Population ageing, due to
the decline in fertility rates and generalized gains in longevity, has a potentially
negative effect on trend growth as it leads to a declining share of the working age
population as currently defined (15-64 years)‘ (Johansson and Guillemette, 2012,
p. 13). Second, it is argued that the advantages from education to increase the
productivity of workers have declined over the past decades and that this trend is
likely to continue. Gordon (2014b) see the major reasons in certain institutions.
They argue, that future increases in high school completion rates are prevented
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by dropping out, especially of minority students (p. 51) and that the inability for
many to finance academic studies is a major problem to further improve education.
Similarly, Eichengreen (2014) argues that the US government has spend too little
on public education over the past decades. The second argument relates to the
views of endogenous growth theories including the role of human capital. From
this perspective, the investments into human capital have been low, so that growth
is also low. Another explanation could be, that marginal returns to human capital
are diminishing. To our knowledge, this argument has not been made yet though.
2.2.3 Insufficient investments
Investments play a crucial role for economic growth, as was the case in all growth
theories covered above. They are important for capital deepening and the applica-
tion of new technologies. Within the recent literature on secular stagnation, several
reasons for insufficient investments have been pointed at: (1) Eichengreen (2014)
argues that low investments by the government, in particular in infrastructure, have
been a major reason for overall low investments in the USA. (2) The decrease in
population growth decreases overall investments and therefore slows down the ap-
plication of new technologies hence dampens technological change (Hansen, 1939;
Krugman, 2014). (3) It is argued that working aged people buy relatively more
capital-intensive goods (in particular housing) and that the demographic change
has therefore decreased the demand for such goods, which also dampens overall
investments (Hansen, 1939; Krugman, 2014). The causes of low investments are
hence argued to be found in low demand or low governmental investments. Accord-
ingly, these views refer to the heterodox and in particular the Keynesian theories
on growth.
2.2.4 Non-competitive market structures
Another explanation for decreasing investment rates refers to market structures.
This work builds on marxian reasoning as outlined above. While Marx assumed
perfect competition in that argument, Baran and Sweezy (1966) argue that post-
war capitalism was marked by increasing concentration of market power. There-
fore oligopolistic and monopolistic market structures had become the dominant
form of market structures. Steindl (1976) argues that such structures introduce
several mechanisms which overall lower investment and growth rates. The mono-
/oligopolistic structures increase profit rates within the concentrated sectors and
thereby lower aggregate demand (assuming higher savings out of profits than out of
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wages). At the same time, investments in these sectors are as monopolists maximize
profits with investments and production below the level within competitive mar-
kets. Due to the low demand, other profitable investment opportunities are scarce
though, leading to an overall reduced level of investments and an equilibrium be-
low potential output. Foster (2014) comes to the conclusion that the outcome of
concentrated markets is ’a chronic condition of secular stagnation’ Foster (2014, p.
87).
2.2.5 Consumption demand
Consumption is the second major component of aggregate demand. Next to invest-
ments, a slow increase in consumption can therefore be another major cause for low
growth. There are again two central arguments. Within the discourse on secular
stagnation, it is argued that consumption slackens due to high income and wealth
inequalities and the accompanying household debts. Summers (2014b) point out
that changes in the distribution of income, both between labor income and capital
income and between those with more wealth and those with less, have operated to
raise the propensity to save, as have increases in corporate-retained earnings (p.
69). Summers argues that this is a reason for the decline of the interest rate. It
also decreases consumption though: Rising inequality operates to raise the share
of income going to those with a lower propensity to spend (Summers, 2014a, p.
33). Krugman (2011) argues on the other hand, that at least before the crisis, the
reason for low growth was not high savings (as the savings rate was not high) but
the trade-deficit in the USA . Nevertheless, Summers’ argument that is also being
made by other such as Gordon (2014b) and Eggertsson and Mehrotra (2014) can
be maintained when looking at other countries of our sample. The second argu-
ment refers not to a lower propensity to consume for higher income-earners at a
certain point in time but over time. The argument is, that due to several mech-
anisms, with increasing average income, people consume a lower share of their
income. This leads to only slowly increasing aggregate demand and subsequently
to low growth. Reuter (2000) made this argument long before the global financial
crisis. He argues that the satisfaction of needs combined with institutional limits
to exponentially increasing consumption are responsible for only slowly increasing
consumption and slow growth. In fact, this line of argument goes back to Keynes’
work. Keynes (1933) argued that with increasing average income, people would
choose leisure time over further consumption increases. These lines of argument
therefore directly correspond to the Keynesian growth theories discussed above.
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2.2.6 Slower increase in energy use
In most economic growth theories, the environment is either seen as a source for
natural resources and/or a sink for emissions. Accordingly, the use of natural
resources is mostly modeled as a third input into the production function. In neo-
classical theory and environmental economics, natural resources are assumed to
be substitutable by physical capital. In ecological economics on the other hand,
substitution between them is regarded to be very limited as they are primarily com-
plements. Based on this analysis, several authors have argued that by accounting
for exergy and/or useful work, economic growth can be accounted for to a much
higher degree than by traditional procedures. Ayres and Warr (2005) find that
useful work can explain much of past economic growth. Interestingly, they can
explain the growth until the mid-1970s almost entirely, while afterwards, this is
less the case. From this point in history, the increase of useful work slows down
significantly. Economic growth slows down less so. An interpretation could be,
that the increase in energy prices has led to a new technological trajectory, which
is depicted by less use of energy and at the same time less productivity growth. At
the same time, there are many other changes going on and this phenomenon needs
further investigation.
3 Methods and Data
As we have seen, most prominent growth theories argue for an exponential growth
pattern. This is represented by one or several ratios, be it the savings ratio, the
speed of technological change, the profit rate or the potential productivity of in-
vestments. Accordingly, a Gross Domestic Product Per Capita (GDPPC) series
underlying the growth models covered so far (excluding the Marxian theory, which
is not clear in this respect) can be represented within a simple regression framework
by the following term:
GDPPCt = b0b
t
1 + εt = b0 (1 + r)
t + εt, t = 0, . . . , T − 1, (10)
where b0 denotes the starting value in t = 0 of the series with T observations, b1
(and thus r) determines the growth of the series, and εt is the error term for the
observation in t.
As an alternative hypothesis we test the exponential model against the simplest
model of diminishing growth rates, which is a model of linear growth:
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GDPPCt = b0 + b1t+ εt = b0 + (1 + r) t+ εt, t = 0, . . . , T − 1, (11)
where b1 (and thus r) now enters the equation in a linear fashion which corresponds
to a constant increase of the GDPPC .
In order to examine these growth theories on an empirical basis, we look at the
economic development for a set of 18 mature economies from 1960 to 2013. In
particular, we decided for investigating yearly real GDPPC series for the group
of Western and Southern European countries and Western offshoots (as defined
by Maddison (2006, Appendix B)). Germany was left out of the sample in order
to avoid problems of aggregation during the period before re-unification in 1990.
Luxembourg was added, which Maddison includes in the group of Small West
European Countries (Maddison, 2006, p. 179). A full overview of the selected
countries can be found below in table 1. The rationale behind the starting point
in 1960 is that effects of World War Two should have vanished by then. As Crafts
and Toniolo (1996) argue, ’In five years at most, Europe recovered the ground lost
relative to the highest prewar income levels. It is, thus, quite safe to place the end
of the first phase of reconstruction and the beginning of a new era in the history of
European economic growth in 1950.’ (Crafts and Toniolo, 1996, p. 3). Since the
data is only available since 1960, we start from there.
It has been argued that the second major reason for high growth rates in Eu-
rope (including the majority of countries of our sample) after World War Two was
convergence. The US-American economy had introduced new production meth-
ods characterised by higher labour productivities over the previous decades, which
European countries had not. From the end of World War Two until the end of
the 1960s the introduction of such technologies in European countries facilitated
the high growth rates (Eichengreen, 2008). In order to exclude this effect, we
additionally execute the empirical investigation for the period 1970-2013.
Due to partly differing GDPPC measures, we analyse two data sets: World Bank
GDPPC series in US$ with 2005 prices and Conference Board GDPPC series in
US$ with 2014 prices. Since the results are very similar, we only report the results
for the first data set mentioned above.2 In this data set, GDPPC data for New
Zealand and Switzerland are only available from 1970-2013.
In a preliminary analysis we compare for each country the coefficients of determina-
tion R2 between a regression of the GDPPC series on a linear and on an exponential
2The data sets, non-reported results and the software code can be obtained from the authors
upon request.
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time trend.3 The first regression corresponds to equation (11) and the latter to
equation (10). In order to obtain the optimal exponential growth rate within the
regression framework, the exponential growth model is estimated for a grid over 50
equidistant values between 0 and 0.06 for r˜4 and the highest R2 is selected.
This procedure represents a rather descriptive approach of comparing linear and
exponential growth of the GDPPC . Making credible quantitative statements about
the data generating process behind the time series is, however, only valid for sta-
tionary series. Only after taking account for possible unit roots and autocorrelation
of time series it is reasonable to compare the adequacy (in terms of predictive abil-
ity) between different time series models. Note that these issues were not tackled
by Wibe and Carlen (2006) and Bourcarde and Herzmann (2006). We therefore
apply the Box-Jenkins method (Box et al., 2011) to find suitable models for the
series at hand. The first step is to determine the order of integration of the time
series. Initialised by Nelson and Plosser (1982), there has been an extensive debate
on whether macroeconomic time series are trend-stationary or follow a unit root
process with a potential drift, see for instance Perron (1989), Shin et al. (1992)
and Cuestas and Garratt (2011). The latter view seems to be the more prominent
in the literature as most authors apply unit root and co-integration techniques to
macroeconomic time series like the GDPPC. In order to check whether unit root
methods are also required for the data set at hand, we conduct for each country
the augmented Dickey-Fuller test for both the original time series and the loga-
rithm (log) of GDPPC series after removing their linear time trends. Note that
removing a linear time trend from a log-transformed time series corresponds to
the deletion of an exponential time trend of the original series. A rejection of the
null hypothesis suggests the absence of a unit root and therefore trend-stationarity.
Likewise, we conduct the KPSS test for the same series, yet the null hypothesis
for this test is trend-stationarity. The results of these tests can be found in Ta-
ble 5 in the appendix. As we find no strong evidence against a unit root and for
trend-stationarity in both the original and the log transformed GDPPC in any of
the countries except for Switzerland,5 we generally assume the series to follow unit
root processes with drift terms. We are aware of the heterogeneity of the countries
and the weaknesses of the underlying tests, as pointed out in Cuestas and Garratt
(2011). In particular, our simple time trend models might not capture true non-
3Note that this approach is essentially equivalent to the comparison of the log-likelihood be-
tween a non-transformed and a log-transformed GDPPC series as done by Wibe and Carlen (2006)
who used GDPPC data up to 2005.
4Clearly, all countries in our sample exhibit a positive growth within the time frame under
consideration.
5We chose a significance level of 5%.
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linear patterns, for instance caused by structural breaks. Nevertheless, as our test
results are quite unambiguous, we are confident that the aggregate findings of the
following analysis should be credible.
Assuming a unit root, the next step is to determine the orders p and q of the
autoregressive process and the moving average process in a suitable ARIMA (p, 1, q)
model with drift. In order to do so, we use the auto.arima function of the R package
forecast (Hyndman and Khandakar, 2008). More specific, we choose among all
candidate models with maximum lag orders p = q = 3 the most appropriate one
with respect to the Akaike Information Criterion for finite sample sizes (AICc).6
This procedure achieves an appropriate compromise between a lack-of-fit to the
data and a too complex model. As we are estimating an ARIMA(p, 1, q) with drift,
we actually model the first differences of GDPPC series. Allowing for a potential
exponential growth, this leads in the simplest case with p = q = 0 to the model
∆GDPPCt = GDPPCt−GDPPCt−1 = b˜0 (1 + r˜)t−1 + ε˜t, t = 1, . . . , T − 1 (12)
where the errors ε˜t are assumed to be independent and identically distributed and b˜0
describes the difference between the first two observations which grows over time at
the rate r˜. A constant and thus linear growth is given for r˜ = 0. We exploit exactly
this property to decide for either a linear or an exponential growth model by using a
similar approach as above: first, for each of the 50 equidistant values between 0 and
0.06 for r˜, the most suitable ARIMA (p, 1, q) model with drift with respect to the
AICc is chosen. In a second step we decide for the final model with a corresponding
growth rate (which we subsequently refer to as optimal model with optimal growth
rate) by comparing the value of several selection criteria amongst all 50 ARIMA
(p, 1, q) models chosen in the first step. The predictive ability of different time
series models is often compared by the accuracy of pseudo-out-of-sample-forecasts.
In those cases, the particular models are fitted to a subsample of the data (e.g. all
observations except for the last 5 years) and the last data points are predicted based
on the estimated model parameters. This procedure essentially tells us which model
forecasts better at the end of the sample. However, we are aware of a potentially big
influence of the recent financial crisis on the results if we solely compared forecast
accuracy for the last years. Thus, for our second step of final model selection, we use
the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), which includes all observed data points
and can thus be seen as a measure for predictive ability for the whole sample
6We also use the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) for model selection in this step and
obtained very similar results. For a comprehensive discussion on model selection criteria in time
series models, see Hyndman et al. (2008, chap. 7).
17
(Hyndman et al., 2008, chap. 7). Furthermore, we also base our selection of
the optimal model on the AICc and the more parsimonious Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC). Despite the advantages of such model selection criteria, the results
are still likely to depend on the chosen sample. For this reason we repeat the
analysis with excluding the recent financial crisis, i.e. considering only the years
1960-2007. As a further robustness check, we discard the first 10 years of the
sampling period and thereby restrict our analysis to the years 1970-2013, in order
to exclude the effect of convergence, as argued above.
4 Results
The results of the R2 comparison between the best exponential fit (chosen among
all 50 grid values for the growth rate r˜) and the linear fit can be found in table
1. For the majority of countries, the linear model fits the data more accurately
than the exponential one. In a couple of countries, the evidence points into the
opposite direction, with the differences between the models being rather small in
these cases, however.
Table 2 depicts the optimal growth rate of the optimal ARIMA (p, 1, q) model
(with respect to the model selection criteria AIC, AICc and BIC after our two-step
selection procedure) explaining the observed GDPPC series for each country.
The linear growth model with r˜ = 0 is preferred for 11 out of 18 countries with
respect to the AIC. Note that some optimal growth rates are not equal but close to
zero and thus far from the magnitude that is usually talked about when discussing
growth rates, indicating a quasi-linear growth. Such an example is Sweden which
exhibits an optimal growth rate of only 0.25%. The behaviour of the AIC over all
grid values for the growth rate r˜ is shown in Figure 1 for the case of Sweden. It can
be seen that the lowest AIC at the growth rate 0.25% is very close to the AIC for
the linear model with r˜ = 0, whereas it becomes considerably larger for increasing
values of r˜.7
The results are fairly robust for the chosen model selection criteria, with the only
exception being Italy: here, the AIC and AICc indicate an exponential growth
model with the largest growth rate r˜ = 0.06 on our grid, whereas the BIC prefers
the linear model. A closer look at the optimal ARIMA(1, 1, 3) model chosen by
AIC and AICc shows a near unit root autoregressive coefficient of 0.9989 and
7Naturally, a quantitative comparison between a linear and an exponential growth model for a
single country is in general not possible if the linear model is chosen, since there is no comparable
best exponential growth model.
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Country R2 exp. fit R2 lin. fit diff.
Australia 0.9910 0.9755 -0.0155
Austria 0.9709 0.9951 0.0241
Belgium 0.9544 0.9886 0.0341
Canada 0.9597 0.9819 0.0222
Denmark 0.9491 0.9774 0.0283
Finland 0.9578 0.9728 0.0150
France 0.9329 0.9779 0.0449
Italy 0.8906 0.9526 0.0620
Luxembourg 0.9509 0.9356 -0.0153
Netherlands 0.9686 0.9824 0.0138
New Zealand 0.9452 0.9246 -0.0206
Norway 0.9526 0.9836 0.0310
Portugal 0.9198 0.9711 0.0513
Spain 0.9403 0.9699 0.0296
Sweden 0.9774 0.9711 -0.0062
Switzerland 0.9566 0.9537 -0.0029
United Kingdom 0.9702 0.9601 -0.0101
United States 0.9760 0.9879 0.0119
Table 1: R2 for exponential and linear model and difference between them. A
positive difference indicates the preference of the linear fit. Time horizon: 1960-
2013.
an implausible negative coefficient for b˜0 which would imply negative exponential
growth.8 In contrast, the BIC points towards an ARIMA (0, 1, 1) model with a
positive linear trend. These unstable results suggest that the development of Italys
GDPPC is hardly predictable, at least within our model class.
The financial crisis following the year 2008 led to a deep recession of the world
economy and was an extraordinary economic event. Since, in our case, the model
selection criteria are likelihood-based measures relying on the normal distribution,
outliers strongly affect the choice of the optimal model and the corresponding
optimal growth rate for differenced series like the ARIMA(p, 1, q) processes.9 We
therefore execute the analysis described above once again, excluding the respective
8For all other countries, the estimate for b˜0 is positive and statistically significant at the 5%-
level. The results are available upon request.
9More specific, the squares of deviations from the mean enter into the estimation. Thus, an
outlier in a differenced series, which has little variation otherwise, has heavy weight on the obtained
results. For a better technical understanding of the maximum likelihood estimation procedure,
the reader is referred to background literature, for instance Fahrmeir et al. (2013).
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Country AIC AICc BIC
Australia 0.0110 0.0110 0.0110
Austria 0.0000 0.0000 0.0025
Belgium 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Canada 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Denmark 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Finland 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
France 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Italy 0.0600 0.0600 0.0000
Luxembourg 0.0037 0.0037 0.0037
Netherlands 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
New Zealand 0.0135 0.0135 0.0135
Norway 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Portugal 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Spain 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Sweden 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025
Switzerland 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012
United Kingdom 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025
United States 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 2: Optimal growth rates leading to the optimal ARIMA (p, 1, q) model with
drift with respect to different model selection criteria. A growth rate of (close to)
zero implies a linear growth model. Time horizon: 1960-2013.
years of the crisis. As table 3 indicates, the results for the same analysis based on
a restricted sample (i.e. without the financial crisis) are quite different from the
ones presented in table 2. In only four out of the 18 countries, a linear growth
model with r˜ = 0 is chosen. Still, there is a remarkable number of countries with
an optimal growth rate which is close to zero and far below commonly discussed
growth rates: For four or five countries, (depending on the selection criterion used),
the selected growth rate lies in the range between 0 and 1%.
Another robustness check investigates only the years 1970-2013. The results in
Table 4 are qualitatively very similar to the ones obtained for the entire sample
period. Only three out of 17 countries (excluding Italy which again exhibits am-
biguous results) depict exponential growth with a growth rate higher than 1%.
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Figure 1: AIC values for the ARIMA (p, 1, q) models chosen for different values of
the growth rate r˜, illustrated for Sweden. A lower AIC indicates a better predictive
ability.
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Country AIC AICc BIC
Australia 0.0245 0.0245 0.0245
Austria 0.0086 0.0086 0.0086
Belgium 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012
Canada 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Denmark 0.0037 0.0037 0.0037
Finland 0.0282 0.0282 0.0282
France 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Italy 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Luxembourg 0.0441 0.0416 0.0416
Netherlands 0.0159 0.0159 0.0159
New Zealand 0.0441 0.0441 0.0441
Norway 0.0110 0.0110 0.0110
Portugal 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Spain 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012
Sweden 0.0220 0.0220 0.0220
Switzerland 0.0331 0.0331 0.0331
United Kingdom 0.0318 0.0318 0.0318
United States 0.0074 0.0074 0.0110
Table 3: Optimal growth rates leading to the optimal ARIMA (p, 1, q) model with
drift with respect to different model selection criteria. A growth rate of (close to)
zero implies a linear growth model. Time horizon: 1960-2007.
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Country AIC AICc BIC
Australia 0.0172 0.0172 0.0172
Austria 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Belgium 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Canada 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Denmark 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Finland 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
France 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Italy 0.0551 0.0000 0.0000
Luxembourg 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Netherlands 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
New Zealand 0.0135 0.0135 0.0135
Norway 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Portugal 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Spain 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Sweden 0.0233 0.0135 0.0135
Switzerland 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012
United Kingdom 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
United States 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 4: Optimal growth rates leading to the optimal ARIMA (p, 1, q) model with
drift with respect to different model selection criteria. A growth rate of (close to)
zero implies a linear growth model. Time horizon: 1970-2013.
23
5 Conclusion
The overall picture of our analyses casts doubts on the widespread belief of expo-
nential growth. The results are not distinct in the sense that we could find clear
evidence whether growth in economically developed countries is in general expo-
nential or linear. We observe, however, high dependence on the sample period, in
particular on the inclusion of the recent crisis (2008-2013). Besides, our modelling
approach is somehow restricted as we only consider linear and exponential trends
in ARIMA (p, 1, q) models. For some of our selected countries other models might
reflect the development of their yearly GDPPC more accurately. With regard to
these caveats, we do not want to overreach in the interpretation of our results. Nev-
ertheless, while using more appropriate time series models and more recent data,
our main finding is in line with Wibe and Carlen (2006) and Bourcarde and Herz-
mann (2006): In contrast to the prominent view of exponential economic growth, a
constant growth might be closer to the truth of what has happened in some mature
economies within the last 40-50 years .
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Appendix
Table 5: Unit root tests for the original GDPPC series and its logarithms.
ADF-Test ADF-Test KPSS Test KPSS Test
Country log. series orig. series log. series orig. series
Australia 0.2840 0.9024 0.0251 0.0100
Austria 0.7787 0.4320 0.0100 0.1000
Belgium 0.9221 0.9182 0.0100 0.0126
Canada 0.3972 0.3698 0.0100 0.0265
Denmark 0.8942 0.8433 0.0100 0.0281
Finland 0.6531 0.1995 0.0100 0.0858
France 0.6775 0.9689 0.0100 0.0100
Italy 0.9900 0.9900 0.0100 0.0100
Luxembourg 0.7471 0.5411 0.0100 0.0100
Netherlands 0.3313 0.5600 0.0100 0.0135
New Zealand 0.3428 0.4783 0.0100 0.0100
Norway 0.9900 0.8900 0.0100 0.0180
Portugal 0.6544 0.6470 0.0100 0.0200
Spain 0.9182 0.3822 0.0100 0.0612
Sweden 0.2203 0.5959 0.0100 0.0100
Switzerland 0.0237 0.0227 0.1000 0.1000
United Kingdom 0.5463 0.4665 0.0452 0.0100
United States 0.6881 0.5351 0.0100 0.0100
A linear trend in a log-transformed series corresponds to an exponential growth.
The KPSS Test in R does not report p-values smaller than 0.01 or bigger than 0.1.
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